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TORTS--STRICTLIABILITY-UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW A
MANUFACTURER MAY BE HELD STRICTLY LIABLE FOR
INJURIES CAUSED BY THE ABSENCE OF A SAFETY
DEVICE EVEN WHEN THAT DEVICE
WAS REMOVED AT THE

REQUEST OF A
KNOWLEDGEABLE PURCHASER

Hammond v. InternationalHarvester Co. (1982)
In April 1977, James Hammond, a farm employee, was operating a
front-end loader tractor manufactured by International Harvestor Company.1 While supervising work beneath him, Hammond apparently slipped
and fell, inadvertently releasing the tractor's boom arms. 2 Because the tractor was not equipped with a roll-over protective structure (ROPS) and attendant side screens, 3 Hammond's body extended over the side of the tractor
4
and he was crushed to death by the descending boom arm.
At the time of the accident, a ROPS was a standard safety device on the
model loader Hammond was operating. 5 However, when the farm manager
purchased the loader in question, he had requested that the ROPS be re6
moved to facilitate movement through a low barn door.
The decedent's wife instituted a tort action against International Harvester, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, on a strict products liability theory. 7 The plaintiff alleged that the
1. Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 648 (3d Cir. 1982).

Hammond was operating an International Harvester 3300 Series B skid loader tractor. Id. at 648 & n.2. The loader bucket on this model is operated by a foot pedal
and is raised by boom arms which extend parallel to the driver's seat from the rear of
the tractor to the bucket at the front. Id. Hammond had operated this tractor for
approximately eight months without mishap. Id. at 648.
2. Id. Hammond and his son were attempting to put a metal leg stand under a
manure conveyor. Id. He was using the tractor's loader bucket to lift the conveyor
while his son attempted to place the stand under the conveyor. Id. Hammond evidently stood up on the knee guard to observe, slipped, and accidently released the
boom arms by hitting the foot pedal control. Id.
3. Id. The front-end loader operated by Hammond ordinarily comes equipped
with a ROPS and side screens which prevent the driver from leaning or falling out of
the operator's seat area. Id. For purposes of this note, the term ROPS will be used to
designate both the rollover protective structure and the side screens.
4. Id. at 648-49.
5. Id. at 648.
6. Id. Hammond was employed by the owner of the dairy farm, Lois Peck. Id.
Peck had also employed a farm manager, John Newlin, who was responsible for ordering the farm equipment. Id. Newlin, who purchased the tractor primarily for use
in moving manure, had the ROPS removed prior to delivery. Id.
7. Id. Jurisdiction in the federal court was based on diversity of citizenship. Id.
Judge Van Artsdalen presided over the trial in the district court.

(851)
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loader that her husband was operating was defectively designed because it
lacked a ROPS. 8 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the
issue of liability, 9 finding that the loader was in a defective condition, both
at the time of sale and at the time of delivery, because it was not equipped
with a ROPS.' 0
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third CircuitII
affirmed, holding that under Pennsylvania law, a product manufacturer is
strictly liable for injuries caused by the absence of a safety device even when
that device was a standard feature removed at the request of a knowledgeable purchaser. Hammond v. InternationalHarvester Co., 691 F.2d 646 (3d Cir.
1982).
A plaintiff in a products liability action 12 may bring suit under various
8. Id. at 649.
9. Id. at 648. The parties had stipulated to an amount for damages prior to
trial. Id.
10. Hammond v. International Harvester Co., No. 78-0944 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 691
F.2d 646 (3d Cir. 1982).
11. The case was heard by Chief Judge Seitz and Judges Garth and Rosenn.
Judge Rosenn delivered the opinion for a unanimous court.
12. Products liability law determines whether a manufacturer or supplier will be
held legally responsible for harm caused by his products. See W. KEETON, D. OWEN
& J. MONTGOMERY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 18 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as W. KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY]. The law of products liability began in 1842
with the case of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex.
1842). Misconstrued dicta from this decision became the basis of a rule that manufacturers or sellers of goods were not liable for harm caused by defects in their products to anyone except the immediate purchaser or one in privity with him. W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 96, at 641 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS]. In the process of carving out exceptions to
the Winterbottom rule, courts modified it to allow recovery, even in absence of privity,
for negligence in manufacturing or selling a product "imminently dangerous to
human life." Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852). Eventually, the New York
Court of Appeals "buried the general rule under the exception" and in MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1976), held that a product is "a
thing of danger" if it may reasonably be expected to place life or limb in peril when
negligently made. See Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1100
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault] (citing 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E.
1050, 1053 (1916). The MacPherson rule was rapidly accepted by the courts in all
jurisdictions and was gradually interpreted to mean that "the seller is liable for negligence in the manufacture or sale of any product which may reasonably be expected
to be capable of inflicting substantial harm if it is defective." W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS, supra, at § 96, at 643. While Mac~herson marked a major change in tort law,
the rule only established a duty upon the manufacturer to use reasonable care in
making his products. The injured plaintiff was still required to prove negligent conduct on the part of the manufacturer. See J. McGILLIAN, J. FIORINI, C. O'CONNOR
& M. BROWN, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY LAW 31 (1977).
The development of the warranty theory of products liability provided additional protection for the consumer. See generally Prosser, The Imphed Warranty of Merchantable Quahty, 28 MINN. L. REV. 117 (1943). In the landmark case of Henningson
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), the New Jersey Supreme
Court held that an ultimate user may recover from a manufacturer on a warranty
theory even though there was no privity of contract between the two parties. Id. at
413, 161 A.2d at 100. Although warranty theory enabled an injured party to recover
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legal theories including negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability in
tort.13 The warranty theory, governed by the Uniform Commercial Code

(UCC), aims to protect the expectations of the parties to a contract.' 4 Recovery under tort theories, however, is based primarily on the social policy of
protecting individuals from various kinds of harm.' 5 Strict liability differs
from negligence 16 in that it imposes liability on the manufacturer or supplier
without proof of fault.' 7 For example, under the Restatement formulation
without proving negligence, the plaintiff suing for a breach of warranty still must
show reliance on the warranty and, prior to bringing suit, must give the manufacturer adequate notice of the injury. See Note, Restatement (Second) of Torts-Section
402A-Uncertain Standards of Responsibility in Design Defect Cases-After Azzarello, Wl
Manufacturers be Absolutey Liable in Pennsylvama?, 24 VILL. L. REV. 1035, 1037 n.15

(1979). Additionally, manufacturers are able to disclaim liability under implied warranties by contractual provisions. See Prosser, The Assault, supra, at 1131-33. For a
more detailed discussion of the evolution of products liability law, see, e.g., Noel,
Manufacturers of Products-The Dri Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963
(1957); Prosser, The Assault, supra; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV.
791 (1966).
13. Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liabihty Law, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579,

583-88 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Keeton, The Meaning ofDefect]. Prior to the 1960's,
recovery in products liability cases was limited to causes of action under theories of
breach of warranty or negligence. Id. at 583. The warranty causes of action consist
of express warranty, implied warranty of merchantability, and the implied warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (1976).
When liability is based on common law negligence, the manufacturer or supplier
is required to exercise the care of a reasonable man under the circumstances. W.
PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 12, at § 96. His negligence may be found anywhere in the process of preparation, manufacture or sale of the product. Id.
For a discussion of strict liability in tort, see notes 17-42 and accompanying text
infra .
14. See Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts PreemptedBy the UCC
and Therefore Unconstitutional? 42 TENN. L. REV. 124, 127 (1974).
15. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, supra note 12, at § 92, at 613.

16. For a discussion of products liability actions based on negligence, see notes
12 & 13 supra.

17. The doctrine of strict liability in tort emerged in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). Here, Justice
Traynor, speaking for the California Supreme Court, stated:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves
to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. . . . [T]he liability is
not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the law of strict
liability in tort.
Id at 62-63, 337 P.2d at 900-01, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700-01. Two years after Greenman,
the American Law Institute promulgated section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. Section 402A provides in pertinent part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965).
Section 402A further provides that the rule applies regardless of whether the
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of strict liability, liability will be imposed upon the seller l" of a product 1 9
which is in a defective condition 20 unreasonably dangerous 2 ' to consumers if
the product reaches the consumer without substantial change in the condi23
22
and the defect causes injury.
tion in which it is sold
Courts and commentators have advanced various policy bases for imposing strict liability on manufacturers and sellers of products. 24 One ramanufacturer exercised reasonable care or whether there was privity of contract between the parties. Id. § 402A(2). The Restatement's theory of strict liability in tort
was rapidly accepted by the courts in almost every jurisdiction. W. PROSSER, LAw
OF TORTS, supra note 12, at § 98, at 657.
18. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A(l)(a) (1965). The Restatement provides
that § 402A is applicable to a seller "engaged in the business of selling such a prod-

uct." Id. Comment f indicates that the term "seller" applies to manufacturers,
wholesalers, and retail dealers or distributors. Id. at comment f.

19. Id. § 402(A)(1). The comments to § 402A indicate that the term "product"
was also intended to include the product's container and both processed and unprocessed articles. Id. at comments e and h.
20. Id. § 402A. Rather than defining "defective condition," the comments to
the Restatement cite examples of the type of defects which would be considered a
"defective condition." Id. at comments h and j. These examples include "harmful
ingredients, not characteristic of the product, . . . foreign objects contained in the
product, . . . [and] decay or deterioration." Id. at comment h. Also, failure to pro-

vide adequate warnings of potential dangers could constitute a defective condition.
Id. at comment j. For a discussion of the judicially created tests used to determine
"defect," see notes 29-42 and accompanying text infra.
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1965). Comments i and j
indicate that for a product to be "unreasonably dangerous," it must be dangerous to
an extent beyond the contemplation of an ordinary consumer. For the text of comment i, see note 40 rnfra. The term "defective" was added to unreasonably dangerous
during the American Law Institute proceedings to insure that there would be no
liability for inherently dangerous products such as knives and whiskey. See Wade, On
the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 830 (1973).
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(1)(b) (1965). Comment p indicates that the Institute was not extending application of the rule beyond products
which are sold in substantially the same condition in which they are expected to
reach the ultimate user or consumer. Id. at comment p. The draftsmen did state,
however, that the mere fact that a product is to undergo processing will not in all
instances relieve the seller of liability. Id. The question is whether the change is
substantial enough to shift responsibility for discovery and prevention of the defect to
the intermediate party who is to make the changes. Id.
23. The seller who sells a defective product is liable for "physical harm thereby
caused to . . . the consumer or to his property." Id. § 402A(1). Normally, liability
under § 402A is imposed in cases involving personal injuries, but it has been extended to wrongftil death actions, property damage, and in a few cases, to economic
loss. See, e.g., Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr.
306 (1968) (wrongful death); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238
A.2d 169 (1968) (property damage); Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 563 S.W.2d 25 (Tex.

Ct. App. 1970) (economic loss).
24. See Davison, The Uncertain Search For a Design Defect Standard, 30 AM. UL.
643, 645; Wade, supra note 21, at 826; Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the
Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803,
809-10 (1976). See generally Shapo, A RepresentationalTheory of Consumer Protection: Doctnne, Function, andLegal Liabihtyfor Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109 (1974);
Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Faultand the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEX.
REV.

L.

REV.

855 (1963).
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tionale is that it is often difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff to prove
that a manufacturer was negligent in the design, manufacture or marketing
of its product. 25 Rather than allowing the victim to go uncompensated, the
primary policy behind strict liability suggests that the loss be shifted to the
manufacturer who may best allocate the losses caused by defective products
among all consumers as a cost of doing business. 26 This rationale is supported by the belief that the availability of products liability insurance
makes losses easier for the manufacturer to bear. 2 7 Additionally, it has been
suggested that the threat of potential liability will give the manufacturer
greater incentive to discover and prevent defects in its products. 2
Attempts to embody these policies into a workable standard of liability
29
have resulted in little consensus as to what constitutes a defective product.
Generally, any of three categories of "defects" may be alleged by a plaintiff
in a strict products liability action. A defect may be due to an error in the
25. Wade, supra note 21, at 826. It has been suggested that although a majority
of product accidents that are not caused by consumer abuse are probably attributable to the negligent acts or omissions of manufacturers at some stage of design, manufacture or marketing, the practical difficulties of discovering and proving negligence
are often insurmountable. See W. KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 12, at
212 (1980). Moreover, it has been argued that potential liability for negligent actions
is generally insufficient to induce manufacturers to market adequately safe products.
Id.

26. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 877 (Alaska 1979);
Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145, 151 (1965). It
has been argued that courts must resolve the conflict between the need for adequate
recovery and the need for viable enterprises through a balancing process which involves a determination of the most just allocation of the risk of loss between members
of the marketing chain. Helene Curtis Indus. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 862 (5th Cir.
1967) (citing Wilson, Products Liabitt)y, 43 CALIF. L. REV. 809 (1955)). For a critical
analysis of the political soundness of the risk spreading rationale, see Klemme, The
Enterprte Liabiity Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 191-94 n.107 (1976).
27. See Wade, supra note 21, at 826. It is generally assumed that the victim is
less likely to have insured against such loss while the manufacturer is normally more
likely to have done so. See Klemme, supra note 26, at 191-92 n.107.
28. See Prosser, The Assault, supra note 12, at 1122-23. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca

Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (Traynor J., concurring)
("public policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively
reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the
market").
29. See Henderson, RenewedJudicialControversy over Defective Product Design: Toward
the Preservationofan Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773, 773 (1979) [hereinafter

cited as Henderson, Renewed Controversy]. The lack of consensus is particularly acute
in the design defect area. According to Professor Henderson, the source of the disagreement over the appropriate standard for determining defective product design lies
in the open-ended nature of the task. Id. at 774. This open-endedness may be contrasted with the more "mechanical inquiry" applied in "flawed product" cases,
whereby the flawed product is merely measured against the manufacturer's design
specifications for that product. Id. at 773-74. In "design defect" cases, the court must
ask, "How much design safety is adequate?" and must develop or adopt some objective standard of adequacy. Id. at 774. See also Products Liability Act S.2361, Report of
the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, S. REP. No. 507, 97th Cong.,

2d Sess. 26 (1982) ("[s]trict liability theories applied in the design area leave the trier
of fact without meaningful guidelines as to when liability is to be fairly assessed").
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31
manufacturing process, 30 insufficient warnings or instructions, or an unsafe

product design.

32

30. Wade, supra note 21, at 831. A manufacturing defect involves a deviation
from the norm, that is a situation in which the final product is not in the condition
that the manufcturer intended. Id. This may result from flaws in the raw materials,
component parts, or from a mistake in their assembly into the final product. W.
KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 12, at 269. Under a deviation from the
norm standard, a product is defective if it is not of the same quality as other similar
products. See Davison, supra note 24, at 647. See, e.g., Elmore v. American Motors
Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (automobile found to
have defectively connected drive shaft); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d
256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (automobile defectively manufactured
where brakes activated unexpectedly). While this standard is workable for manufacturing defects, it is unsuitable for design defects where presumably the manufacturer
adopted a defective design for the entire product line. See Davison, supra note 24, at
647-48.
Many jurisdictions apply a more subjective "consumer expectations" standard
to manufacturing flaw cases. See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 435
P.2d 806 (1967) (liability imposed upon manufacturer, absent proof of defect, because tire did not perform according to the reasonable expectations of user). For a
discussion of the "consumer expectations" standard for determining defectiveness, see
notes 35 & 40 infra. For a discussion of the recurring issues regarding manufacturing
defects, see Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donahur, Product Liability-An Interaction of
Law and Technology, 12 DuQ. L. REV. 425 (1974).
31. W. KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 12, at 295. Lack of adequate
warnings or instructions may constitute a defect if the manufacturer fails to provide
sufficient information to permit the consumer to use the product with reasonable
safety or fails to warn of the hidden dangers which may result from the product's use
or misuse. Id. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974) (manufacturer must disclose those dangers
that the application of reasonable foresight would reveal). For a discussion of the
recurring issues regarding the adequacy of warnings in strict liability in tort, see generally The Duty to Warn andStrict Liability, 48 INS. COUNS. J. 381-98 (July 1981); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Product LitbilityDesign Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976).
32. See Davison,supra note 24, at 643. In design defect cases, although the product is made in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications, the design itself is
inadequate because the manufacturer failed to use some alternative safer design.
One commentator has drawn a distinction between "inadvertent design errors" and
"conscious design errors." See Henderson,JudicialReview of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices. The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1547-50 (1973).
"Inadvertent design errors" resemble manufacturing errors in that the product does
not function as intended. Id. at 1548-49. For a discussion of manufacturing flaws, see
note 30 supra. Inadvertant design errors result from inadvertent failure of the design
engineer to appreciate the implications of his design or to employ commonly understood and accepted design principles. Id. at 1548. "Conscious design errors," on the
other hand, are risks of harm which result from the conscious decision of the design
engineer to accept the risks associated with the intended design because the designer
believes the increased benefits or reduced costs justify conscious acceptance of the
risks. Id. The error appears when the court finds that the end was not justifiable
when these competing interests-the risks and benefits-are weighed. See id. at 1553.
An issue related to product defects is "crashworthiness" or "second collision"
defects. See generally W. KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 12, at 412. Applied most often to motor vehicles, the concept focuses on defects which do not cause
the initial accident, but may add to or enhance passengers' injuries when they collide
with the interior or exterior of the vehicle. Id. See, e.g., Larsen v. General Motors
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Cases involving alleged design defects comprise the most uncertain area
of strict products liability law. 33 Much difficulty and disagreement have
arisen in formulating a workable standard for determining when a design is
"defective."

34

Various standards have been suggested and depending on the jurisdiction, a product may be defectively designed if it fails to perform as safely as
an ordinary consumer would expect;3 5 it is unreasonably dangerous considering the product's utility and the risk involved in its use; 36 it involves risks
which would cause a reasonable seller, having knowledge of its harmful
character, not to market the product;3 7 it fails to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in a reasonably foreseeable
manner or the defendant fails to prove that the product's utility outweighs
its risks; 38 or it left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to
Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968) (car manufacturers are accountable for vehicular safety in the crash environment). "Crashworthiness" defects may be design
defects or manufacturing defects. Davison, supra note 24, at 643 n. 1. The doctrine
has also been applied to aircraft, motorcycles, and tractors. W. KEETON, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY, supra note 12, at 423 n. 11. For a discussion of the recurring issues regarding "crashworthiness," see generally Galerstein, A Review of Crashworthiness, 45 J. AIR
L. & COMM. 187 (1979); Note, Products Liabihy--Second Colhsion-EnhancedInjuries, Apportionment of Damages, 15 DuQ. L. REV. 733 (1977). For a detailed discussion of

design defects, see notes 35-42 and accompanying text infra.
33. See note 29 supra. See also Henderson, Renewed Controversy, supra note 29, at

773; Note, supra note 12, at 1035-36.
34. See Davison, supra note 24, at 645.
35. See, e.g., Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 69
Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) ("[i]f the average consumer would reasonably
anticipate the dangerous condition of the product and fully appreciate the attendant
risk of injury, it would not be unreasonably dangerous and defective"). For a discussion of the "consumer expectations approach," see note 40 infra.
36. See, e.g., Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.
1974), rev'don other grounds, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) (risk created by vehicle without protective roll-bar outweighed its utility). For a discussion of the "risk-utility"
approach, see note 41 infa.
37. See Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974)
(manufacturer liable if jury finds that a reasonably prudent manufacturer, knowing
of the machine's propensity to regurgitate thin wood sheets when it was set for thicker sheets, would not have marketed the machine in the same fashion). This test imposes constructive knowledge of the condition of the product on the manufacturer.
Id. at 492, 525 P.2d at 1036. If the seller would have been negligent for selling the
product knowing of the risk involved, he is liable regardless of whether he in fact had
such knowledge. Id. This test is supported by Professors Wade and Keeton. See
Keeton, Product Liability andthe Meaning ofDefect, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Wade,
supra note 21, at 834. One difference between the Wade and Keeton formulations is
that Wade would impute knowledge of the defect to the manufacturer at the time the
product was sold while Keeton would impute knowledge at the time of trial. 269 Or.
at 492 n.6, 525 P.2d at 1036 n.6. Compare Keeton, supra, at 38, with Wade, supra note
21, at 834.
38. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978). This hybrid approach gives the plaintiff the alternative of proving that
there was a defect under either the "consumer expectations" standard or under the
"risk-utility" analysis. Id. The California Supreme Court, in Barker v. Lull Engineering
Co., formulated this dual approach in recognition of the assertion that "the expecta-
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make it safe for its intended use. 39 The underlying difference between these
various standards is the particular jurisdiction's emphasis on one of three
considerations: consumer expectations,4 0 risk-utility, 41 or allocation of
tions of the ordinary consumer cannot be viewed as the exclusive yardstick for evaluating design defectiveness because '[i]n many situations. . . the consumer would not

know what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be
made.' " 20 Cal. 3d at 430, 573 P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236 (quoting Wade,
supra note 21, at 829). Under the "consumer expectations" prong of Barker, the
plaintiff has the burden of showing that the product failed to perform as safely as the
ordinary consumer would expect. 20 Cal. 3d at 431-32, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 239. Under the risk-utility analysis, the plaintiff has the burden of proving
that the product's design was the proximate cause of his injuries. Id. The burden of
proof then shifts to the defendant to show that benefits of the design outweigh its
inherent risks. Id. See also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska
1979).
39. See Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978). Pennsylvania is the only state to adopt the "every element" standard promulgated in Azzarello.
Deleting the "unreasonably dangerous" language from strict products
liability analysis, the Pennsylvania court insisted that the risk of loss must be borne
by the supplier "without regard to fault." Id. at 553, 391 A.2d at 1024. For a further
discussion of Azzarello, see notes 52-58 and accompanying text intfra.
40. A "consumer expectations" analysis is based on comments g and i to § 402A
of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS. Comment g defines "defective condition" in part as "a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be
unreasonably dangerous to him." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at comment
g (1965) (emphasis added). Comment i defines "unreasonably dangerous" in part as
follows:
Many products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption,
and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from
over-consumption. Ordinary sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and
castor oil found use under Mussolini as an instrument of torture. That is
not what is meant by 'unreasonably dangerous' in this Section. The article
sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordnaty customer who purchases it, with the ordinaryknowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
Id. at comment i (1965) (emphasis added).
Although many courts have used a "consumer expectations" analysis in determining what constitutes a "defect," Professor Keeton contends that this standard is
inadequate for judging an alleged design defect because, under this approach, "a
manufacturer is not responsible for failing to add a relatively inexpensive safety device if the purchaser knows that it does not exist and that there is a resulting danger."
Id. Moreover, consumers often have no definite expectations regarding a given product which leaves the jury to speculate as to a product's defectiveness. See Keeton,
Manufacturer's Liability. The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture andDesign of Products,
20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 591 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Keeton, Manufacturer's
Liabiity].
It has been suggested that a "consumer-expectations" emphasis embraces the
seller-oriented standard as well. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485,
493, 525 P.2d 1033, 1037 (1974); Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th
Cir. 1973); Davison, supra note 24, at 650. For a discussion of the seller-oriented
standard, see note 37 and accompanying text supra. The assertion is that they are
two sides of the same standard; if it would be unreasonable for a manufacturer to
market a particular product knowing of its risks, then necessarily he would be marketing a product which would fall below the reasonable expectations of a purchaser.
See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. at 493, 525 P.2d at 1037. For examples
of design defect cases adhering to the consumer expectations approach, see, e.g.,
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859

42

In 1966, Pennsylvania judicially adopted section 402A of the RESTATE43
Eight years later, the Pennsylvania Supreme

MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS.

Young v. Tide Craft, Inc., 270 S.C. 453, 242 S.E.2d 671 (1978) (lack of a kill switch
not beyond contemplation of consumer); Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen,
485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (lack of decal on glass door to warn of its
presence not beyond the contemplation of consumer).
41. Under the "risk-utility" approach, either the judge or the jury determines
whether the magnitude of the risk created by the product's design outweighs the
product's benefits or utility. See Henderson, Renewed Controversy, supra note 29, at 775;
Davison, supra note 24, at 654. Professor Keeton has suggested that the utility of a
given design should be determined by evaluating three important factors: the needs
served by the product; the technological and economic feasibility of serving the same
needs with an alternative product; and the feasibility of providing the desired utility
with a safer product. Keeton, Manufacturer'sLiabiity, supra note 40, at 592-93. On the
other hand, Dean Wade has suggested seven factors to be weighed when making a
risk-benefit analysis. See Wade, supra note 21, at 837-38. These factors are:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of
the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or
instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Id. (footnote omitted). Dean Wade would impute knowledge of the dangerous condition to the defendant and ask whether the defendant was negligent in marketing the
product in that condition. Id. In other words, scienter is applied as a matter of law.
Wade then proceeds with a risk-utility analysis, applying the seven factors to weigh
the magnitude of the risk created by the dangerous condition against the product's
social utility. Id. at 834-35.
For examples of design defect cases applying a risk-utility analysis, see, e.g.,
Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162, 583 P.2d 276 (1978); Allen v. Rodgers
Mach. Mfg. Co., 268 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa, 1978); Ross v. Up-Right, Inc., 402 F.2d 943
(5th Cir. 1968).
42. Courts which advocate the no-fault "allocation of loss" rationale maintain
that the manufacturer should bear the cost of product-related injuries because they
are in a position to allocate the loss among all consumers as a cost of doing business.
See, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 134, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104
Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 553, 391 A.2d
1020, 1023 (1978). For a discussion of Azzarello, see notes 52-58 and accompanying
text znfra.
43. Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 427, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (1966). Webb involved a
suit against a brewer, beer distributor, and keg manufacturer for injuries resulting
from a beer keg explosion. Id. at 426, 220 A.2d at 854. Describing the issue as "the
nature and scope of the liability in trespass of one who produces or markets a defec-
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Court in Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co. , abolished the horizontal privity
requirement in strict liability actions, 45 concluding that a manufacturer by
46
virtue of section 402A, "is effectively the guarantor of his products' safety."

The following year, in Berkebile v. Brantly Helcopter Corp. ,47 a two-mem-

ber plurality of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the words
"unreasonably dangerous," although found in the text of section 402A, 48
have no place in strict products liability actions. 49 Expanding the concept of
defectiveness to include lack of appropriate warnings and/or instructions,5"
the court concluded that a seller must provide a product with "every element necessary to make it safe for use." 5 1
tive product for use or consumption," the court, in a very brief opinion, declared

§ 402A to be "the law of Pennsylvania." Id. at 426-27, 220 A.2d at 854.
44. 457 Pa. 24, 319 A.2d 903 (1974). In Salvador, the employee of the purchaser
of a steam. boiler brought an action against the manufacturer for damages the plaintiff sustained when the boiler exploded. Id. at 26, 419 A.2d at 904.
45. Id. at 31, 319 A.2d at 905. Privity is the relationship that exists between the
seller and the purchaser of goods. Murray, Pennsylvania Products Liabiiy." A Clarifcatton of the Search For a Clear and Understandable Rule, 33 Prr-r. L. REV. 391, 395 (1972).
If horizontal privity is required, only the actual purchaser of goods may bring an
action for injuries caused by the product because the purchaser is the only party
having a contractual relationship with the seller. Id. at 395. Thus, if a wife
purchased food, only she would be in horizontal privity with the seller, not members
of her family who may be injured by consumption of this food. Id. The Salvador
court concluded that § 402A eliminated any logical basis for requiring horizontal
privity. 457 Pa. at 31, 319 A.2d at 905. The court reasoned that allowing recovery
only to the actual purchaser would be inconsistent with the policy that the manufacturer is the guarantor of his product's safety. Id. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907.
46. 457 Pa. at 32, 319 A.2d at 907. The court stated that it is against the public
interest to permit manufacturers to escape liability for injuries caused by defective
products placed in the stream of commerce. Id.
47. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975), noted in Note, Products Liability-Restatement
(Second) of Torts--Section 402A-Under Pennsylvania Law Must a Defective Product Be "Un-

reasonably Dangerous"?, 21 VILL. L. REV. 794 (1976). In Berkebile, the plaintiff brought
suit against the manufacturer of a helicopter for the wrongful death of her husband
who was killed when the helicopter crashed. Id. at 91, 337 A.2d at 897. The plaintiff
alleged, inter aha, that the rotor system of the helicopter was defectively designed, the
rotor blade was defectively designed and manufacturered, and that the helicopter
was defective due to inadequate warnings regarding the risks involved in its use. Id.
at 92, 337 A.2d at 897.
48. For the text and discussion of § 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, see notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
49. 462 Pa. at 96, 337 A.2d at 900. According to the court, allowing the jury to
consider the reasonableness of the seller's actions would undermine the policy announced in Salvador that the manufacturer is the guarantor of his product's safety. Id.
at 97, 337 A.2d at 902.
50. Id. at 100, 337 A.2d at 902.
51. Id. The court stated that "defective condition" is not limited to design or
manufacturing defects. Id. An element which may make a product safe for its intended use may be a warning and/or instruction concerning use of the product. Id.
Pennsylvania law of strict products liability was in a state of flux after the
Berkebile decision. See, e.g., Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (district court, applying Pennsylvania law, refused to follow Berkebile). Because the opinion was signed by only two justices, several courts refused to accord the
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The plurality decision in Berkebile was subsequently clarified by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co.52 A unanimous court held that the term "unreasonably dangerous" has no place in
instructions to a jury as to the question of defect. 5 3 Justice Nix, writing for
the court, stated that "the jury may find a defect where the product left the
supplier's control lacking any element necessary to make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended
'54
use.
The court went on to delineate the respective roles of judge and jury in
determining whether a given product design is defective. 55 Initially, the
56
judge is to determine, in a risk-benefit analysis whether liability would be

justified as a matter of law under plaintiff's averment of the facts, considering the "social policy" underlying products liability law and proper place57
If the judge finds that liability would be justified,
ment of the risk of loss.

decision precedential value. See, e.g., Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F. Supp.
1268, 1276 (E.D. Pa. 1975), afl'dmem, 538 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1976). The district court
in Beron criticized the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's failure to suggest an adequate
replacement standard when they deleted the "unreasonably dangerous" standard.
Id. The district court maintained that the phrase "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" is a "unitary concept" and its severance would frustrate the intent of the
drafters. Id. at 1274.
52. 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), noted in Note, supra note 12. InAzzarello,
the plaintiff's right hand had been pinched between two hard rubber rollers in a
coating machine which was manufactured by the defendant. Id. at 549, 391 A.2d at
1022. The issue on appeal was the appropriate form ofjury instruction under § 402A
in Pennsylvania. Id.
53. 480 Pa. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027. In removing the concept of "unreasonably
dangerous" from the jury's determination, the court relied on a California case,
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972). Cronin was greatly criticized because, in removing the "unreasonably dangerous" element, the California court provided no alternative definition of "defect" or
"defective condition." W. KEETON, Products Liabi'ty, supra note 12, at 256-57. To
alleviate the confusion which followed the Cronin decision, the California Supreme
Court adopted the two prong test set forth in Barker v. Lull Eng'g, 20 Cal. 3d 413,
573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). For a discussion of the Barker decision, see
note 38 and accompanying text supra. The Azzarello court stated that the phrase
"unreasonably dangerous" has no independent significance but, rather, represents a
label to be used where it is determined that the risk of loss should be placed on the
supplier. 480 Pa. at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025. Further, the court stated that the phrases
"unreasonably dangerous" and "defective condition" are simply terms of art invoked
when application of strict liability is appropriate. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
54. Id. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027. The court opined that a jury instruction which
embodies this language "expresses clearly and concisely the concept of 'defect' while
avoiding interjection of the 'reasonable man' negligence terminology." Id. at 559
n.12, 391 A.2d at 1027 n.12.
55. Id. at 556, 391 A.2d at 1025.
56. Id. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026. Citing Dean Wade's observation that a riskbenefit analysis should not be made by the jury, the court stated "[s]hould an illconceived design which exposes the user to the risk of harm entitle one injured by the
product to recovery? . . . When does the utility of the product outweigh the unavoidable danger it may pose? These are questions of law and their resolution depends upon social policy." Id.
57. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026.
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the case is submitted to the jury "to determine whether the facts of the case
support the averments of the complaint." 58
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not addressed the question of
whether a manufacturer may be held strictly liable for injuries caused by the
absence of a safety device when such device was removed at the request of a
knowledgeable purchaser. 59 However, Arkansas, New York, and the Sixth
Circuit applying Tennessee law have refused to impose liability on the manufacturer where the safety device was a standard feature removed at the
purchaser's request, 60 or an optional feature which the purchaser declined to
58. Id. The court reasoned that standards such as "unreasonably dangerous"
are not adequate to guide a lay jury in determining the existence of a defect. Id.
Most courts leave the questions of "defectiveness," like negligence, to the jury.
W. KEETON, supra note 21, at 237 n.4. The Azzarello court, on the other hand, held
that the judge is to conduct a risk-benefit analysis to resolve the question of the appropriateness of liability prior to submitting a case to the jury for a determination of
the truth of plaintiffis averment of facts. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026. Professor
Henderson has suggested that the Pennsylvania court's bifurcation of the defect analysis was based on a misinterpretation of Dean Wade's proposal regarding cost-benefit
analysis. See Henderson, Renewed Controversy, supra note 29 at 799. Id. (citing Wade,

supra note 21, at 840). Wade had suggested that the seven factors for determining
whether a product was unreasonably dangerous should not be submitted to the jury.
Wade, supra note 21, at 840. The judge should consider these factors, but the jury
should be instructed to consider whether a reasonably prudent manufacturer would
have marketed the product with knowledge of its harmful character. Id. at 839-40.
For a discussion of the use of this standard in determining "defect," see note 37 and
accompanying text supra. Professor Henderson contends that the Pennsylvania court
in Azzarello erroneously concluded that a risk-benefit analysis is useful to judges and
lawyers, but not useful to lay juries to whom ultimate responsibility for a decision will
be given in a close case. Henderson, Renewed Controversy, supra note 29, at 799.
59. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the lack of a safety device
may constitute a design defect where such absence of a safety device causes accidental injury of a type which could be expected from normal use of the product. See
Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 354, 247 A.2d 603, 605 (1968). However, the
Third Circuit reached a somewhat different result in Taylor v. Abbe, Inc., 516 F.2d
145 (3d Cir. 1975). In Tay/or, the owner of a pebble mill ordered parts from the
defendant supplier. Id. at 146. At the time of the sale the supplier offered to provide,
for $110.00, a safety guard to cover the point where two gears meshed. Id. The mill
owner rejected the offer and an employee subsequently lost his hand in an accident
which could have been prevented by the guard. Id. at 146-47. The Third Circuit,
applying Pennsylvania law, held that the supplier was not liable for the employee's
injuries. Id. at 147. Stressing the fact that the supplier had offered the safety guard
to the owner, the court stated that "a supplier should be required only to make a
bona fide offer of a safety device." Id. at 148. Pointing out that this case involved
only a supplier of parts, the court did go on to suggest that there would be a stronger
argument for liability "[w]here a manufacturer sells a complete pre-assembled product minus only a safety device." Id. at 148-49.
60. See White v. Clark Equip. Co., 262 Ark. 158, 553 S.W.2d 280 (1977). In
White, the plaintiff's husband was killed when the forklift he was operating fell backward. Id. at 159, 553 S.W.2d at 281. The plaintiff brought an action against the
forklift manufacturer and distributor alleging that the forklift was defective because
it was not equipped with any overhead protection. Id. at 161, 553 S.W.2d at 282.

Because the employer had specifically ordered the forklift without an overhead guard
to enable it to enter trailors with low ceilings, the court stated that there was "simply
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6
purchase. 1
The Third Circuit, addressing what it characterized a "narrow issue,"62
began its analysis in Hammond by reviewing the development of Penn63
The court then applied the legal
sylvania's modern products liability law.
framework set out in "the Pennsylvania products liability trilogy," Salvador,
65
Berkebile, and Azzarello ,64 to the facts of Hammond.

• . . no factual basis for the jury to find liability on the part of the [defendants]." Id.
at 161, 553 S.W.2d at 282.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying Tennessee law, upheld a
directed verdict in favor of the manufacturer and supplier of a bulldozer that was not
equipped with an overhead guard. Orfield v. International Harvester Co., 535 F.2d
959 (6th Cir. 1976). In Orfild, the plaintiff was struck in the chest by a tree while
operating a bulldozer on a construction site. Id. at 959-60. Plaintiff offered evidence
that an overhead guard would not have adversely affected the operation of the bulldozer and would have prevented his injury. d. at 960. Applying a "consumer expectations" analysis of strict liability under section 402A of the Restatement, the court
held that because the plaintiff testified that he was aware of the condition of the
bulldozer and the danger involved in its use, he failed to prove that the bulldozer was
dangerous beyond his knowledge as an ordinary consumer and, therefore, failed to
prove it was defective. Id. at 964.
61. Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 64 A.D. 2d 204, 409 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1978),
appeal dented, 46 N.Y.2d 711, 416 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1978). In Biss, plaintiff's testator
received fatal injuries when the loader he was operating collided with a telephone
pole. Id. at 205, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 857. Plaintiff alleged that the loader was defectively
designed because it lacked a ROPS and that this defect caused decedent's injuries.
Id. at 206, 409 N.Y.S. at 875-76. Concluding that the action involved liability for
"second-collision" defects, the court held that, in such a case, manufacturers and
suppliers are held to the same standard applied in negligence cases generally, that is,
reasonable care. Id. at 207, 409 N.Y.S. at 876. For a discussion of "crashworthiness"
or "second collision" defects, see note 32 supra. The ROPS had been offered to the
decedent's employer as an optional feature when he purchased the loader. 64 A.D.2d
at 207, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 876. The New York court concluded that once the availability of safety options is explained to the purchaser, the duty to exercise reasonable care
in selecting those appropriate to the product's intended use rests upon the purchaser.
Id. at 207, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77. Because the dangers incurred in the use of construction equipment vary according to the job and site for which the equipment is
being purchased and used, the court reasoned that the purchaser is in the best position to make a judgment regarding the balance of cost and function. Id. Accord
Wagner v. International Harvester Co., 611 F.2d 224 (8th Cir. 1979) (accepted Biss
as a sound legal theory but found it inapplicable to facts of the case). See also Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 79 A.D. 2d 287, 436 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1981) (purchaser in
best position to make judgment regarding the necessity of crash bars on motorcycle).
62. 691 F.2d at 648. The court stated that the narrow question for review was
where a knowledgeable purchaser of farm equipment instructs the manufacturer of that equipment prior to delivery to remove a safety device incorporated as a standard feature in its product design, and an experienced
employee of the purchaser who operates the equipment loses his life in an
accident which probably would not have occurred if the standard safety
device had been in place, may the manufacturer be held liable for the employee's death under Pennsylvania products liability law?
Id.
63. Id. at 649-50. For the development of Pennsylvania products liability law,
see notes 43-58 and accompanying text supra.
64. For a discussion of Salvador, Berkebile and Azzarello, see notes 44-58 and accompanying text supra.
65. 691 F.2d at 650-52. For a discussion of the facts of Hammond, see notes 1-6
and accompanying text supra.
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Affirming the district court's holding that the loader in question was
"unreasonably dangerous" as a matter of law, 66 the Third Circuit agreed
that, under Azzare/lo, the case was properly submitted to the jury. 67 Judge
Rosenn, writing for the court, was persuaded that a ROPS was an element
necessary to make a front-end loader safe for use and therefore, under Azzarello and Berkebile, the loader without the ROPS was defective. 68 The
court opined that the fact that a ROPS is normally a standard feature on the
International Harvester loader reflects the manufacturer's judgment that the
ROPS should, for safety's safe, be equipped on every loader. 6 9 As further
evidence of the necessity of a ROPS, the court noted that regulations
promulgated by the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA)
require that a ROPS be attached to every tractor unless it is presently being
used in or near a building with low clearance. 70 Thus, if the OSHA regulations had been effective at the time of the sale of tractor in Hammond, they
71
would have required the tractor to come equipped with a ROPS.
Further, the Third Circuit stated that it was irrelevant whether International Harvester acted reasonably or prudently in accepting an order for a
tractor without a ROPS. 72 Under Pennsylvania law, the court reasoned, a
manufacturer's care or prudence has no bearing on a product's defectiveness. 73 Defectiveness is determined solely by the condition in which the
product is delivered to the consumer.7 4 Because International Harvester
had both designed and manufactured the tractor in question, the court
found that "it [was] wholly responsible for the condition in which the tractor
' 75
was delivered."
66. 691 F.2d at 651.
67. Id. Under Azzardlo, the judge is required to decide as a matter of law
whether the facts alleged would justify the imposition of liability on the manufacturer. 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026. If the court answers in the affirmative, the
case is given to the jury for a determination of whether the facts alleged are true. For
a discussion of Azzare/lo, see notes 53-58 and accompanying text supra.
68. 691 F.2d at 651.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. The ROPS could have been removed when being used to haul manure
from the barn-the primary purpose for which it was purchased-but would have
had to have been attached at the time of Hammond's accident. Id. OSHA regulations did not govern the Hammond case because the tractor inquestion was manufacturered prior to the effective date of the regulations. Id. at 651.
72. Id. at 652.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893
(1975); Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978)).
75. Id. The court distinguished Taylor v. Abbe, 516 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1975),
where the Third Circuit held that a parts supplier was not liable for injuries to a
pebble mill employee caused by the lack of a safety device, on the ground that in
Taylor, the defendant parts supplier "had neither designed nor manufactured the
pebble mill." Id. For a discussion of the decision in Tay/or, see note 59 supra.
The court further stated that additional cases cited by International Harvester
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Additionally, the court stated that decedent's failure to exercise due
care was also irrelevant since he had no influence over the condition of the
loader when purchased. 76 The court reasoned that any risk assumed by the
77
purchaser may not be imputed to an innocent employee.
The Third Circuit also rejected International Harvester's contention
78
that the Azzarello jury charge was inapplicable to the facts of Hammond.
The court briefly noted that a request not to apply the Azzarello charge
amounts to a request to overrule Azzarello, a decision which was not within
the province of a federal court sitting in diversity. 7 9
Reviewing the Third Circuit's decision, it is submitted that the court
had no alternative but to apply Azzarello to the facts presented in Hammond. 80 The product defect alleged in Hammond does not fall neatly into any
defined category of defect. 8 ' International Harvester consciously designed
its front-end loader with a ROPS included as a standard feature, therefore, it
was not a classic design defect. 82 Moreover, it was not a typical manufacturwere inapposite to the facts in Hammond. 691 F.2d at 651-52 n.6 (citing Bowman v.
General Motors, 427 F. Supp. 234 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Dreisonstok v. Volkswagonwerk,
489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); and Biss v. Tenneco, 64 A.D. 204, 409 N.Y.S.2d 874,
409 A.2d 204 (App. Div. 1978)). The court concluded that
Bowman and Dreisonstok address themselves to situations in which a
manufacturer was consciously balanced considerations of safety, convenience, and cost and has settled upon a design which is not optimally safe.
Biss concerns a situation in which the manufacturer was declined the balancing task and left the decision of whether to purchase optional safety
devices to the consumer.
In the instant case, by contrast, the manufacturer balanced considerations of safety, convenience, and cost, and opted for a skid loader design
that maximized safety by including the ROPS as standard operating equipment. Yet, at the purchaser's request, the manufacturer delivered the skid
loader without a ROPS.
Id.
76. 691 F.2d at 652.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 650 n.4. For a discussion of Azzarello, see notes 53-58 and accompanying text supra. International Harvester had argued that the Azzarello charge was inappropriate under the factual circumstances of Hammond because in a situation where
the absence of a safety device is at issue, the "every element" standard removes the
question of defect from the jury's consideration. Brief for appellant at 10-12. The
result is a guaranteed verdict for the plaintiff. Id. For a discussion of the "every
element" standard set forth in Azzare/lo, see note 55 and accompanying text supra.
79. 691 F.2d at 650 n.4. The Third Circuit stated that, as a federal court sitting
in diversity, the court was not free to second guess the wisdom of the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court. Id.
80. For a discussion of the facts in Hammond, see notes 1-6 and accompanying
text supra.
81. For a discussion of the categories of defects, see notes 29-32 and accompanying text supra.
82. Ordinarily a design defect is found when a manufacturer fails to realize the
necessity of a particular safety device and designs his product without it. See note 32
and accompanying text supra. The finding of a design defect results in an indictment
of an entire product line rather than just a single mismanufactured item. See W.
KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY supra note 12, at 364. In Hammond, on the other
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ing defect since it was not the unintentional result of an error in the manufacturing process.8 3 The alleged defect resulted because the loader was
customized at the purchaser's request to make it conform to the purchaser's
needs. However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that a missing
safety device can be a design defect when the lack of a device causes acciden84
tal injury of a type which results from normal product use and there is no
indication that the Pennsylvania court would hold differently when only a
single product was missing such a device.
It is submitted that this is an unfortunate result because application of
85
When
Azzarello to the facts of Hammond denies the jury any real function.
a safety feature has been removed at the purchaser's request it quite obviously does not have "every element" necessary to make it safe. Thus, unless
the judge determines as a matter of law that a product lacking such a safety
device is not unreasonably dangerous, the jury is left with no alternative but
to impose liability. It is submitted that the question of whether such a missing safety feature constitutes a "defect" should not be removed from the
86
jury's determination.
It is suggested that the impact of the Hammond decision will be to convey
to manufacturers the message that products should not be customized to suit
an individual purchaser's needs if such customization entails removal of a
safety device. 87 Additionally, Hammond exemplifies the need for Penn88
sylvania Supreme Court delineation of limits to Azzarello's application.
hand, International Harvester designed the loader with a ROPS as a standard feature. 691 F.2d at 648-49. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. The safety device
was missing only on the one tractor and only because the purchaser requested its
removal. 691 F.2d at 648.
83. For a discussion of manufacturing defects, see note 30 and accompanying
text supra.
84. Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 354, 247 A.2d 603, 605 (1968).
85. For a criticism of Azzarello's effect on the role of the jury, see note 58 supra.
86. It is submitted that making such a determination is not beyond the compre-

hension of a lay jury. Moreover, this would not be imposition of a negligence standard because the jury would look solely at the condition of the product. The
manufacturer's state of mind would be irrelevant.
87. As the New York court noted in Birs, the dangers involved in construction
vary from job to job. Thus, the purchaser is in the best position to balance cost and
function to determine the safety standards necessary at a particular site. For a discussion of Biss, see note 61 supra. However, holding the manufacturers responsible provides employees with greater protection from management misjudgment regarding
safety.

88. The Azzarello decision has left uncertainty regarding the appropriate test for
determining when the risk of loss should be placed upon the supplier. D. Richman &
J. Perry, Products Ltabiity Update 5 (October 30, 1982) (Villanova Law School Center
For Continuing Legal Education's Legal Development and Skills Program). Although the "every element" standard suggests perfect safety, the court suggested a
risk-utility analysis when it said "when does the utility of a product outweigh the
unavoidable danger it may pose? These are questions of law and their resolution
depends on social policy." Id. at 3-4 (quoting 480 Pa. at 558, 391 A.2d at 1026).
Moreover, the Azzarello court indicated that a consumer expectations approach may
be appropriate when it stated that the Restatement formulation is "primarily
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It is submitted that a further consequence of the Hammond decision may
be to -rekindle legislative attempts to change the substantive law of products
liability in Pennsylvania8 9 and possibly encourage federal legislation applicable to all states. 9 0 However, until limits are placed on the Azzarello decision by either the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the state legislature,
manufacturers will have, in effect, "absolute" rather than "strict" liability
for any injuries caused by their products.
Palrzcia Moran
designed to provide guidance for the bench and bar." Id. at 4 (quoting 480 Pa. at
558, 391 A.2d at 1026).
There is also uncertainty over what instructions, if any, may be given the jury to
explain the suggested instruction. Id. at 5. The court quoted Professor Wade's suggestion that when one of the risk/utility factors "has special significance, it may be
appropriate for the judge to make reference to it in suitable language." Id. (quoting
Wade, supra note 21, at 840).
89. In 1979, House Bill 1083 was introduced in the Pennsylvania House of Representatives. Pa. H.B. 1083, 1979 Sess.; Pa. S.B. 784, 1981 Sess. The bill called for,
inter aha, the reinstatement of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement as an element of strict liability and elimination from the jury instruction the language that
the manufacturer is the "guarantor" of his product's safety. An amended version of
the bill was passed in the House of Representatives in February, 1980, but failed to
be recommended by the House State Government Committee.
90. See S. REP. No. 670, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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